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In the Supre1ne Court of the
State of Utah
\
LARRY L. JONES and DELLA MAE
JONES, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

CASE
NO. 9240

GROW INVESTMENT AND MORTGA.GE
COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since this appeal involves a determination of issues of
both law and fact, a somewhat detailed statement of the
facts is desirable.
After some preliminary negotiations, the respondents,
in the latter part of October, or the forepart of November,
1958; purchased from the appellant a new "model" home
in Utah County, Utah, located on real property described
as follows:
Lot 3, Block 4, Plat "B", Keyyridge Heights
Subdivision, Orem, Utah County, Utah
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Mr. Jones, one of the ·respondents, first saw the property between Oetober 20 and October 30, 1958 (Tr. 22).
He visiifJed the property with the appellant's salesman on
at least two and possibly three oocasioos (Tr. 26 and 27).
In addition to those visits, 'he was given a key rto the home
and dro~e by and looked at it a couple of times and showed
it to other people (Tr. 27). He made aiTangements to purchase ·the 'house and moved into it, bachelor style, in November, 1958, and Mrs. Jones arrived from Grand Junction with the furnishings in December of thart: year (Tr.
21) . The property was conveyed to the respondents by
the appeillant on or aborut Decembm- 12, 1958, by warranty
deed, subject to "deed restrictions and easements of record.'' (Complaint, paragraph 1, Findings of Fact, paragraph
8)
When Mr. Jones went upon rthe property in the latter
part of October, 1958, ·he observed the irrigation ditch, of
which ·he subsequently complained, along the east end of
the property (Tr. 22, 28). He also observed the extension
of the ditch as it traversed the east end of the contiguous
property on the north, and observed that it was "a big
ditch" (Tr. 28). He could see no difference between this
open ditch, and irts appearance as it traversed rtne rear of
his property, and the same ditch as it extended along its
entire length ~to the north (Tr. 30), and he testified, on crossexamination, that this extended ditch to the north appeared, at the time of trial, to look the same as his ditch
did when ·he moved. into the property in question in No-vember, 1958 (Tr. 30).
Notwithstanding the fact thaJt Mr. Jones, a drilling engineer by profession (Tr. 29), observed the ditch at the
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rear of his property and its extension to the north, ,he testified, on cross-examination, that he did not make any inquiries of anyone concerning the dirtch or where any of the
water went in any of the ditches he observed (Tr. 29 and
30). The ditch was a large irrigation ditch, about two and
one-'half feet deep and two and one-half to three feert wide
(Tr. 44). Although Mr. Jones testified, at one point, rthat
the ditch appeared to be pretty 'Weill ·filled up (Tr. 22 and
23), it required about six large dwnp truck loads of gravel
and dirt to fill the same (Tr. 152) .

Mr. Jones was :inf.o~ed by Mr. UiJbel, the appellant's
salesman, orf the existence and na.Jture orf the irrigation ditch
toward rthe end of Oetober, 1958, and was mfiormed of the
use made of the same (Tr. 72 and 73). He also was advised
that he might fence the property prorvided such fence were
installed on the west side of the ditch (Tr. 73 and 74). Mr.
Jones' version of this eonversation diffe~ed somewhat from
the versioo of Mr. Uibel, when Mr. Jones testified in rebuttal, but he had already testified on eross-erxamination that
he made no inquiries of any®e concerning the ditch (Tr.
29 and 30).
It is clear from the evidence that in the latter part of
October, 1958, when the sale of the property was negotiated and in Nove,mber, 1958, when the sale was eonsumm.ated, there was a typical irrigation ditch extending rthe full
width of the property at the rear therea.f through which,
at regular intervals, there flowed a stream of water
amounting to fow- or five second feet (Tr. 47 and 48).
From the southeast corner of the property, irrigation water
was conveyed through a covered and water proofed concrete pipe (Tr. 91) extending to the west and across the
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street to other properties. There was no clear proof and
no substantial evidence that the covered pipe running east
and west is actually upon the property of the respondents.
The evidence is more persuasive that it is upon the aJbutting property on the south.
After the transaction had been concluded and the
deed to the respondents recorded, the respondents installed
a fence on three sides of the property and left the front open
(Tr. 23) and installed a 22 inch pipe along the east end of
the property and eovered 'the same and leveled the surface
(Tr. 25). This pipe connected with the. existing pipeline
running east and west at the south side of the property and
the existing steel protective grating in thart pipeline was
removed and reinstalled at the north end of the new pipeline by the respondents (Tr. 25). At the time of the trial,
there was no vi~sible evidence of any ditch or pipeline on
the respondents' property. .Aibout Christmas time in 1958
(Tr. 24) and before installing the pipeline at the east end
of the property, the respondents commenced to fill in the
open ditch, but received an objection thereto by a lower
water user as soon as the filling process was started (Tr.
24).
The ditch and pipeline in question service approximately 15 acres of land below the respondentS property
(Tr. 6). These water users ·have received water through
the ditch and pipeline in question foc several years, including the years 1957 and 19'58 (Tr. 10, 11, 13, 14 and 16).
The water is used in rturns as prescribed by the water master (Tr. 18) , and these turns oocur about once every week
during the irrigation season (Tr. 18). The usual irrigation season runs from May to the last of October (Tr. 41)
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(Ex. 4). Mr. Martin, one of the respondents' witnesses,
testified, on cross-examination, thaJt he used the water
through the irrigation ditch and pipeline in question "every
water turn as such is prescribed by the water master
• • • •" (Tr. 18) and the respondents' witness, Mr. Rappleye, when asked to examine his wateT ticket for 1958 and
the spring of 1959 (Ex. 4), and state Whether or nort he
took the water on most of the dates shOIW11 thereon, testified: "Well, ye~s, most of the time" (Tr. 46).

Mr. Jones rtestified that .there' was rubbish ·and debris
in the ditch when he examined it in Ocobm-, 1958, and stated that it looked ike a prertty well filled up ditch (Tr. 22).
At the same time, he testified that the ditch looked the
same at that time as the extension of the same to the north
looked at the time of the trial (Tr. 30). Referring to pictures of the open ditch extending north from the respondents' property ·which were taken at the ti1me o[ the trial,
(Ex. 1, 2 and 3), Mr. Kenne,r, the respondents' principal
witness, testified that it shorwed a ditch "which is probably quite a typical irrigation ditJoh with grorwth * * * *
(Tr. 33).
Sometime afiter a oorvered :pipe had been installed by
the respondents at the rear of their property, they complained to various officers or personnei of the appel1ant
company by telephone, and at least on ooe occasion by letter addressed to Mr. Grow, eoncernin:g the cost, only, of
installing rthe pipe (Tr. 96), but on no occasion, until the
filing of the complaint, was any mention made by the respondents of the pipeline along the south side of the property (Tr. 96 and 97) . There was no easement recorded
for the irrigation ditch or pipeline (Findings of Fact), but
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at the time Mr. Jones examined the property in the latter
part of October, 1958, ·he saw a visible, open irrigation ditch
across the rear of said property (Findings of Fact). On
the basis of the foregoing, the respondents sought judgment against the appellant for breach of waiTanJty against
encumbrances and the court, in its memorandum decision,
found for the respondents and entered judgment against
the appellant for damages in the swn of $7'50.00, from which
decision and judgment the appellant has prosecuted this appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO
FIND, AS A MATTER O·F LAW, THAT THE EXISTENCE 0'F 'THE OPEN, VISIBLE AND NOTORIOUS IRRlGATION DITCH AND EASEMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF THE COVENANT AGAINST
EN·CUMBRANCES.
POINT II
THE CO·URT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT UPON
OBSE'RVING THE OPEN, VISIBLE, AND NOTORIOUS
IRRIGATIO'N D1ITCH TRAVERSING SAID PROPERTY
THE RESPO·NDENTS HAD AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY
TO INVESTIGATE AND MAKE INQUIRY CONCERNING THE SAME AND THAT INQUIRY OF THE APPELLANT ALONE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT.
POINT ill

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND
ING TO FIND THAT THE EXCEPTION

REFUsFROM
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THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE OF THE COVENANT
AGAINST RE·STRICTIONS AND EASEMENTS OF RECORD, INCLUDED OPEN, VISIBLE, AND NOTORIOUS
EASEMENTS OBS·ERVED BY THE RESPONDENTS.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND, AS A MA'I*I'ER OF LAW, THAT THE
RESPONDENTS WERE ESTOPPED FRO·M ASSERTING
ANY CLAIM O·F BREACH 0 F wARRANTY FOR THE
EASEMENT ENCUMBRANCE BY VIRTUE OF HAVING HlAD ACTUAL NOTICE O·F THE EXIS~NCE OF
SAID EASEMENT O·R OF HAVING BEEN APPRISED
OF FACrS IMPOSINIG UP·O·N THEM THE DUTY OF
FURTHER INQUIRY.
1

POTNT V
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VISffiLE, OPEN ffiRIGATION D~ITCH ACROSS THE REAR
OF THE PROPERTY APPEARED TO DEAD-END AT
THE SOUTH LINE OF THE PREMIS·ES INVOLVED
AND TO BE ABANDO•NED.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FIND[NG OR ~CONCLUD
ING THAT THE 22 INCH CEMENT PIPE RUNNING
IN A WESTERLY ·DIRECTION FROM THE END OF
THE REAR OPEN DITCH WAS UPON THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION AND IN FURTHER FINDING THAT
SAID PIPELINE WAS COMPLETELY COVERED AND
NOT VISIBLE TO THE RESPONDENT, LARRY L.
JONES.
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POINT

vn

THE ,COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANT'S AGENT REPRESENTED THlAT THE
DITCH AT THE REAR OF SAID PROPERTY COULD
BE FILLED IN AND THE YARD LE:vELED AND IN
FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND, UPON THE EVIDENCE, THAT THE APPELLANT'S AGENT INF·01RMED THE RESPONDENT, LARRY L. JO·NES, THAT
SUCH FENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE INSTALLED
WEST OF SAID DITCH.
POINT VIII
THlE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS FIRST ·LEARNED
THAT THERE WAS AN EASEMENT BY PRESCRIP•
TION .A!CROSS THEIR PREMISES FOR SAID IRRIGATION DITCH WHEN THEY HAD PROCEEDED TO
FILL IN THlE SAID DITCH.

POINT IX
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE DAMAGED BY THE PRESENCE
OF SAID EASEMENT IN THE SUM OF $750.00 AND
IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND THAT THE
RESPONDENTS SUFFERED NO DAMAGE.
POINT X
THE CO·URT ERRED IN PERMITI'ING THE RESPO,NDENTS' WITNESS, MR. KENNER, TO TESTIFY
AS TO WHAT HE USUALLY CONSIDERED TO BE A
REASONABLE WIDTH OCCUPIED BY AN EASE:MENT.
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POINT XI
THE ·COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RESPOND·ENTS·' OIBJECTION TO THE TESTIMONY OF
THE APPELLANT'S WITNESS, MR. GROW, UPON THE
QUESTION OF WHAT THE CANAL COMPANY DID
IN THE WAY OF ACQUIESCING TO· CHANGES IN
THE EASEMENT OVER SAID PR·OPERTY.
POiNT XII
THE co~URT ERRED IN OVERRIULIN:G THlE OBJECTION OF THE APPELLANT TO THE QUESTION
POSED BY THE RESPONDENTS TO MR. S.TEIN AS
TO THE DIFFEREN~CE IN THE VtALUE OF THE LAND
IN QUESTIO·N IF THE SAME WERE 12 FEET NARRJOWER AND 12 FEET LESS DEEP.

THE ARGUMENT
PO·INT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO
FIND, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THlE OPEN, VISIBLE AND N·OTO~RIOiUS IRRIGATION DITCH AND EASEMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF THE COVENANT AGAINST
ENCUMBRANCES.
The weight of authority and the better reasoned rule
in the United States and particularly in the arid and semiarid regions of the west supports and sustains the proposition that purchasers of property obviously and notoriously
subjected at the time to some right of easement or servitude affecting its physical condition, take such property
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subject to such right withourt any e~ress exceptions in the
conveyance, and the vendors are not liable on their ·covenants by reason of the existence of such easement. Kl.!fZ
vs. MC CUNE, 22 Wis. 628, 99 Am Dec 85. See also, 5'5
Am. Jur. 626, Sect. 154 and Anno. 57 A.L.R. 1427 and 1545
and 64 A.L.R. 1482 and 1499. The foregoing case of KUTZ
vs. MC CUNE involved a conveyance of a tract of land by
a deed containing rbhe usual ocvenants of seisin and against
encumbrances, without &ceptions to those covenants. At
the time of the purchase, between 30 and 40 acres of the
land were flowed ~by a mill-pond created by a dam on land
not belonging to the grantor, which dam had been maintained long enough to create a prescriptive right in the
owner of it to flow the land in question. The action was
brought by the grantee for breach of the covenants of seisin and against encumbrances by reason of this existing
right of flmving. The Court pointed out that the same
principJe has been applied in the case of highways open and
in use upon land at the time of the conveyance of the same,
RAWLE ON COVE'NANTS, 141 et Seq; SCRIBNER vs.
HOLMES, 16 Ind. 142, and indicated:
"In the case of fue highway, the doctrine does not rest
upon the fact that the right is in favor of the public,
but that rthe easement is obvious and notorious in its
character, and rthat therefore the purchaser must be
presumed to have seen it, and to have fixed his price

for the land with reference to its actual condition at
the rtime.''

The Court went on to state:
"The substantial fotmdation for :both classes of decisions is the strong, natural presumption that the parties sell on the one hand, and buy on the other, the
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property in its actual physical condition, allld subject
to such rights, either in favor of the vendor or others,
as that physical condition obviously indicates, without
exceptions or reservations concerning them in the
deed. So that the decisions that an existing ·highway
in favor of the public, and a right of flowing the land
conveyed by the vendor, as it was done at the time of
the ~conveyance, do not constitute breaches of rthe cov·
enant against encumbrances fo[' whioh the vendor is
lia:ble, really rest upon the same principle."
The reasoning of the Courts in supporting this proposition ·was set out with clarity in the Idaho ease of SCHUR-

GER. vs. MOORMAN, 20 Idaho 97, 117 P. 122, 36 LRA
N.S. 313, in his language:
''Encum,brances are of two kinds, viz: (1) such as
affect the title: and (2) those which affect only the
physical ~condition of the property. A mortgage or
other lien is a fair illustration O!f the former; a public
road or a right-of-way, of the latter. Where eneumbrances of the former class exist, rthe ,cmrenant referred
to, under all the authorities, is bvoken the instant it is
made, and it is of no importance that the grantee had
notice of them when he took the rtitle. Such mcumbrances are usually of a temporary cham.oter and
capable of removal. The very object of the covenanrt
is to protect the vendee against them. Hence, lmowledge, ·actual or constructive, orf their existence, is no
answer rto an action for breach of such cmrenant.
Whe~ however, there is a servitude imposed upon
the land which is ·visible to the eye·, and which affects,
not the title, but the ,physical ~condition of the property, a different rnle prevails."
The Idaho case quoted from the Pennsylvania case of
MEMMERT vs. MCKEEN, 112 Pa 315, 4 ATL 542, in
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which the Supreme Court o[ Pennsylvania had under consideratioo the question as to whether an open, notorious
easement of which the purchaser had full notice at rtJhe time
of the ptWchase and the execution of the deed should constitute a breach of covenant against encumbrances. The
Idaho ease involved a ~canal which imposed a servitude upon the complainant's property.
In DESVERGERS vs. WILLIS, 56 Ga. 515, 21 Am
Rep 289, 1cited in t~e Idaho case, the Supreme Court of
Georgia ·had under eonsid~ation the question as to whether

or not a ·covenant against encumbrances contained in a deed
was broken by the existence of a public road over the land,
which was known to the purchaser at the time of. purchase. In passing upon rthat question, Chief Justice Waxner, speaking for the court, said:
''The decisions of the Courts of this country are not
uniform upon this question, but the weight of authority, we think, is that the existence of a public road upon the land known to the pwchaser, is not such an
encumbrance as would constitute a breach of the covenant of warranty. This view of the question is sustained by the better reason, especially as applicable
to the ·condition of the people of this State."
In HOLMES vs. DlANFORTH, 83 Me. 139, 21 Atl. 845,
the Supreme Court of Maine also considered the question
as to whether or not a eovenant against encwnbrarnces was

broken by the existence of a public road, and 'held that tile
purchaser took the deed ·with notice of the existence of
the road, and that "he must accept the land cum onere,
and will not be allowed to complain m that encumbrance
as a breach of the covenants in his deed.''
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In the New York case of WHJITBECK vs. COOK, 15

Johns 483, 8 Am, Dec. 272, involving, also, the question of
a public road, the court said:
''It must strike the mind wirth surprise that a person
who purchases a farm through which a public road
runs at the time of purchase, and had so run long before, who must be presumed to have known of the existence orf the road, and chooses to have it included in
his purchase, shall turn round on his grantor and complain that the general covenants in the deed ·have been
broken by the existence of ·what he saw when ·he purchased, and what must have enhanced the value of
the farm. lt is hazarding little to say that sueh an
attempt is unjust and inequirtaJble, and contrary to the
universal understanding of ·both vendors and pur1

chasers.''
The Ida!ho case which has been cited in some detail
herein involved land coming under the "Carey Act" granting easements over public lands, but this was nort the determining factor in rthe decision.
The question of the effect of the existence of a drain-

age ditch right-of-way upon a covenant against encumbrances in a deed was also considered in the ease of
STUHR vs. BUTIERFIELD, 151 Iowa 736, 130 NW 897,
36 LRA N.S. 321, and the Court employed this language:

''Ordinarily the allowance of damages to a vendee with
full lmowledge of the physical conditions evidencing
an easement which ·cannot be changed subsequently
by the vendor, and which are so apparent that they
must ~have been taken inrto account in making the
transfer, on a breach of warranty against encumbrances immedia.ltely upon receiving a deed containing such
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warranty, is little less than putting a premiwn on dishonesty *

* * ,''

The California Supreme Court has likewise supported
the position of the appellant in rthe case of SISK vs. CASWELL, 112 Pac. 185, in 'holding that where there is a phy..
si.cal burden on real estate whioh is visible, the presumption, in the absence of an express agreement, is that the
'burden is not an encumbrance, within a covenant against
encumbrances. See also, SOMERS vs. LEISER, a recent
Washington ease, reported in 259 P. 2d, 843, involving a
visible easement.
In the Nevada case of MONTESA vs. GELMSTEDT,

270 P. 2d 668, the Court held that where the plaintiff purchased property from the defendant with full knowledge
of lateral irrigartion ditches and their use, the plaintiff was
charged with notice of the apparent easement, and the servient character of her property, even though the deed to
her by ,the defendant contained no express reservation
thereof. This case involved land which had formerly been
used and cultivated, primarily for agriculture, but was yielding to the inroads of subdivisions and home building. In
1mB respect, the facts sharply parallel those in the instant
case.
Open and visible burdens on property are reciprocal
and the purchaser of property burdened by such open
and visible easements is held to take rthe same with the
benefits and subject to the burdens existing. WAKEN vs.
G~LESPIE, 15·3 Okla 78, 4 Pac. 2nd 1028; ROLLO vs.
NELSON, 96 Pac. 263, 34 Utah 116, 26 LRA (N.S.) 315:
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND, A:S A MA'ITER OF LAW, THAT UPON
OBSERVING THE OPEN, VISIBLE, AND NOT<)RIOUS
ffiRIGATION DITCH TRAVERSING SAID PROPERTY
THE RESPON·DENTS HAD AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY
TO INVESTIGATE AND MAKE IN QUIRY CONCERNING THE SAME AND THAT INQUIRY OF THE APPELLANT ALO·NE WAS NO·T SUFFICIENT.
1

It is clear from the evidence rthat the respondents made
no inquiry of anyone concerning the irrigation dirtch they
observed at the back of the property. In response to a
question propounded to the respondent, Laxry L. Jones,
by appellant's counsel:
Q. ''Did you make any inquiries of anyone ·concerning the ditch tback of ~our place?'' (Tr. 29)

The respondent answered:
A.

"No sir, I did not." (Tr. 30)

Open use and enjoyment of an easement over land is
constructive notice to the purchaser of the land of the existence of such easement and the rights of the owner thereof
where inspection of the premises would readily rmreal such
facts as to put the purchaser ·on inquiry. TAYLOR INV.
CO. vs. KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,

322 Pac. 2nd 817, 182 Kan. 511, citing 28 ·C.J.S. Easements,
49. .
In the New Mexico case of MUTZ vs. LE SAGE, 397
Pac. 2nd 876, 61 NM 219, the court ·held that one Who purchased land across which a well defined, clearly marked
road ran and who knew that neighbors were using the road,
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but who failed to make inquiry, oonrerning their right to
do ·so was charged with nortice of the facts which an inquiry
would have disclosed.
The inquiry to be made by one who sees visible signs
of an easement should not be ·confined to the grantor alone.
WRIGHT vs. WILLIS, 23 Ky L. Rep. 565, 63 S.W. 991.
F<or physical conditions which will charge the pur-

chaser of a servient estate with notice of an easement, see
Annotations at 41 ALR 1442 and 74 ALR 1250.
POINT ill
THE CO.URT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSIN·G TO FIND THAT THE EXCEPTION FROM
TI:IE DEED O~F CONVEYANCE OF THE COVENANT
AGAINST RESTRICTIONS AND EASEMENTS O·F RECORD, INCLUDED OPEN, VISIBLE, AND NOTORIOUS
EASEMENTS ORSERVE·D BY THE RESPONDENTS.
The recorrd disclosed that there were no written easements of record affecting this property. It is clear in this
case that the parties considered the existence of the visible
easement and attempted to provide for an exception thereto in the wovding of the deed. The fiaot that unfortuitous
circumstan·ces alone decreed thai the easement, the existence of which was wen known to all the parties to this
transaction, was born of prescription and had therefore not
been recorded, should nort be allowed to defeat the manifest intention Off the parties in exeepting from the usual
covenants of the appellant's deed "restrictions and easements of record". Since there were no easements which
·bad been recorded, it is obvious that the parties contemplated the existence of the visible prescriptive easement and
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sought, by the wording of the deed, to signify the intention
of the respondents to accept and of the appellant to convey the property burdened with the easemenrt and to provide for its exclusion from any covenant against encumbrances. Recordation is manifestly only a substitute for
actual notice. It is constructive or substituted notice and
should not be accorded greater weight than the indisputable actual notice of the respondents in this case. The
Kansas case of FEDERAL SAVIN·GS & LOAN INSURANCE CORPORATIO·N vs. URSCHELL, 157 Pac. 2nd
805, 159 ~ansas 674, ~held thart nortice of an easement ·will
be imputed to a purchaser where the easement is properly
recorded or is of such character that a 'PtwChaser, acting
with ordinary diligence, would learn of its existence.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND, AS A MA'ITER ~OF LAW, THAT THE
RESPONDENTS WERE EJSTOPPED FRO'M ASSERTING
ANY CLAIM OF BREACH 0'F WARRANTY FOR THE
EASEMENT ENCUMBRANCE BY VIRTUE OF HAVING HlAD ACTUAL NOTICE O~F THE EXISTENCE OF
SAID EASEMENT OR OF HAVING BEEN APPRISED
OF FA!CTS IMPQ,SING UP0'N THEM THE DUTY OF
FURTHER INQUIRY.

The argument in support of Point III :hereof is equally
applica!ble to Point IV.
There can be no question in this case thast the respondents were aware of the existence of the large, open, ~and
visible irrigation ditch. In response to the question put to
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the respondent, Larry L. Jones, on cross-examination, as
to whether or not he saw a ditch there, he replied:

A. "Yes Sir. I am not blind; I could see that
ditch, It was a big ditch." (Tr. 28)
Yet he testified, further, that notwithstanding this fact,

he did not ·make any inquiry of anyone concerning the ditch
(Tr. 30). To employ the language of the Supreme Court
of l!owa in the case of STUHR vs. BUTrERFIELD, cited
above, to permit the respondents, under these circumstances, to later recover for breach of warranty against encumbrances ''is little less than putting a premium on dishonesty.'' This. is particularly true where, as in this case,
an attempt was obviously made to limit the covenants of
the grantor in its deed by excepting easements obviously
thought to be of record. In determining the existence of
such an easement, the purchaser of the servient estate is
chargeable with knowledge of facts which he would have
acquired by the exercise of ordinary diligence and the observance of facts of common knowledge in the vicinity.
BERLIN vs. ROBBINS, 38 P. 2nd, 1047, 180 Wash., 176.
For physical conditions which will charge fue purchaser of a servient estate with notice of an easement, see
annotations at 41 ALR 1442 and 74 ALR 1250.
POINT V
1"HE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VISIBLE, OPEN IRRIGATION DITCH ACROSS 1"HE REAR
O·F THE PROPERTY APPEARED TO DEAD-END AT
1"HE SOUTH LINE OF 1"HE PREMISES INVOLVED
AND TO BE ABANDONED.
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The finding of the Court that the ditch across the rear
of the property which the respondent, Larry L. Jones, observed appeared to dead-end at the South line of the premises involved and to be abandoned is eontrary to the great
weight of the evidence and cannot be reconciled with the
Wlcontroveflted and unbiased evidence and testimony found
in the record. The plaintiff, according to his own admission, viewed the property :between the 20th and the 30th
day of Octobe·r, 1g.5g (Tr. 22). According to ·his own testimony, the ditch at the rear o[ the property was ·clearly
visible (Tr. 28) and he observed the extension of ·the ditch
for an indefinite distance to the north (Tr. 28). Even if
it be conceded that fuere may have been some trash and
debris in the ditch, the respondents' testimony that the
ditch appeared to dead-end at ~his property and to be abandoned is not ·credible when considered with the testimony
of the lower water users to the effect that the' irrigation
season extended from May to the end of October, during
which time the water users 'had water turns ~about once
every week from a stream carrying from four to five second feet (Tr. 18, 41, 46, and Ex. 4). The testimony of Mr.
Martin and Mr. Rapleye, both respondents' witnesses,
shows that the ditch in question was being actively used
at almost exactly the time when Mr. Jones, according to his
own admission, examined the p~operty. A ditch characterized in the manner the respondent, Larry L. Jones, attempted to ·characterize it, eould not posstbly have aooomm~
dated an irigation stream of four to five second feet and
the consistent and extended use of the ditch for irrigation
purposes for the entire irrigation season of 1958 eould not
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
doned. This physical evidence has to be set completely at
naught as well as the testimony of Mr. Uibel to the effect
that 'he informed the respondent, Mr. Jones, respecting the
nature and use of the ditch, and the testimony of Mr. Jones
must be accepted in toto concerning a conversation about
the ditch which he testified to having 'had with Mr. Uibel
after ·he had already testified on cross-examination that he
made no inquiry of anyone eoncerning the ditch at the back
of the place (Tr. 29 and 30, to sanction the finding of rthe
court. The respondent evidently encountered no difficulty
in discovering the grate at the easterly end of the covered
pipeline and removing it to the north end of the pipe he installed and it is submitted that the law, und& the circumstan,oes, imposed upon him a duty of more than "a casual
inspection,'' as set out in the Memorandum Decision of the
Court. It is inherently improbable that the volume of water which was oonveyed through the ditch for the entire
irrigation season of 1958 and emending to the end of October of that year oould have created such a situation in
the ditch as to leave the respondent or anyone else wtih the
impression that the ditch had been abandoned and renders
equally improbable the -conclusion that he could have failed,
on reasonable inspection, to see where the ditch connected
with the covered pipeline rU!Illling east and west along the
sourth side of the p~operty. The pictures of the di1Jch to the
noi"tJh taken at the time of trial (Ex. 1, 2 and 3) clearly depict a typical irrigation ditch, and these pictures, it must
be remembered, were taken long after the end of the irrigation season.

In M~C DOUGAL vs. LAME, 39 Ore. 212, 64 Pac. 864,
the Supreme Court of Oregon held that a ditch by which
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water was diverted from its natural ehannel for ·mining purposes was notice of the right to maintain irt across the premises, where, fior part of the way at least, its existence was
plaintly marked upon the ground, although elsewhere it
had become nearly filled with debris.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDIN·G OR CONCLUDIN~G THAT THE 22 INCH CEMENT PIPE RUNNING
IN A WESTERLY DiiREJCTION FRJO~M THE END OF
THE REAR ~OPEN DITCH W.A:S UPON THE PROPERTY IN QUESTIO·N AND IN FURTHER FINDING THAT
SAID PIPE'LINE WAS CO·MPLETELY COVERED AND
NOT VISIBLE TO THE RESPONDENT, LARRY L.
JONE.S.
The argum·ent sUJbmitted under Point V above is equally
applicable to Point VI, and may be addressed 1Jo the same.
It is submitted further, that there is no clear or convincing evidence in the record establishing that the :covered
pipeline on the south is even upon the property in question.
The pipeline was installed on the south in the spring 01f 1957
(Tr. 90 and 91). Mr. Grow testified that ·he was not sure
that the pipeline was even on Lot 3, Block 4, Keyyridge (Tr.
90). W1hen first asked by respondents' counsel where, with
respect to the south side of the lot on which the house in
question was situate, the ditch ran west, Mr. Rappleye, the
respondents' ·witness, testified:

A. "It went right through the fenee line on the
next place south of it" (Tr. 7).

It is true that after some goading and ~helpful questioning by counsel, the witness placed the ditch on the lot to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
the north of that fence (Tr. 8). How he -could testify as to
the position of the ditch with reference to the fence prior
to the installation of the pipeline in 1957, or to the pipeline.
itself, cannot be understood, since ·the fence referred to in
the picture the witness was examining when the question
was propormded to him was not installed until after the acquisition of the property by the respondents in the latter
part of 1958 (Tr. 23). The COurt's finding is rendered
more impotent by the testimony of Mr. Heal to rthe effect
that the distance between the north and south fence lines
at the front of the property measured between 70 and 71
feet, (Tr. 147) by actual measurement, whereas the corresponding distance shown on the plat of the survey is 68.2
feet (Tr. 119). This issue becomes importanrt in view of
the fact that all the real estate people who testified as to
damage, attributed such dam.age, almost exclusively, to the
pipeline on the south, and almost completely disconnted any
damage on account Olf the easement at the rear of the property (Tr. 54, 112, 138, and 145).
POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANT'S AGENT REPRESENTED THAT THE
DITCH AT THE REAR OF SAID PROPERTY COULD
BE FILLED IN AND THE YARD LEVELED AND IN
FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND, UPON THE EVIDENCE, THAT THE APPELLANT'S A:GENT INFORMED THE RES.PONDENT, LARRY L. JONES, THAT
SUCH FENCE WO·ULD HAVE TO BE INSTALLED
WEST O,F SAID DITCH.

On this point, there is a conflict in the testimony of
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LaiTy L. Jones and ~red ,Uibel.

We believe, however, that
Mr. Ui!bel's testimony more nearly accords wirth what the
physical features of the land revealed. Also, it should be
remembered that before giving his version of the conversation with Mr. Uibel, Mr. Jones had already testified, on
cross-e~amination, that he did not make any inquiries of
anyone concerning the ditch ba:ck of the place (Tr. 30). In
the face of the undisputed use that had already been made
of the ditch to ~convey an irigation stream oonsisting of four
to five second feet of water :fjor the full irrigation season
of 1958, extending to the last of o~otober of that year, the
respondents' version of the conversation with Mr. Uibel is
not worthy of belief.
1

POINT VIII
TH!E COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THE RE'SPO,NDENTS FIRST LEARNED
THAT THE~RE WAS AN EASEMENT BY PRESCRIP--

TION ACROSS THEIR PREMISES F10R SAID ffiRIGATION DITCH WHEN THEY HAD PRO,CEEDED TO
FILL IN THIE SAID DITCH.
1

There is no question but that the Respondent, Larry
L. Jones, observed the ditch at the rear of the property, in
October, 1958, before a sale of the property was consummated and recognized that it was an irrigation ditch (Tr.
28). Observing the ditch as he did, within days of its actual use, he was 'charged with knowledge of those facts which
the exercise of ordinary diligence would have revealed and
with notice of those facts which a reasonable inquiry woruld
have disclosed. BERLIN vs. ROBBINS, 38 Pac. 2d 1047,
180 Wash. 176; MUTZ vs. LE SAGE, 297 Pac. 8d 8.76, 61
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N.M. 219; FEDERAL SAV. & LOAN IN.S. CORP. vs. URSCHEL, 157 Pac. 2d 805, 159 Kan. 674. See also, PIONEER MINING C·O. vs. BANNOCK GO,LD MINING COMPANY, 60 Mont, 25·4, 198 Pac, 748, which held that the
existence of a ditch and flume running to a mill was notice
to the pUI'!chaser of the servient estate. Also, annotations
at 41 ALR 1442 and 74 ALR 1250.
POINT IX
THE COURT E.RRED IN FINDING THAT THERESPONDENTS WERE D~AMAGED BY THE PRESENCE
O~F SAID EASEMENT IN THE SUM OF $750.00 AND
IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND THAT THE
RESPONDENTS SUFFERED NO DAMAGE.
It is, of course, Appellant's primary position oo this
appeal that the existence of the open, visible, and notorious irrigation ditch and easement did not constitute any
breach of Appellant's 1covenants against encumbrances and
that, therefore, no damages can properly be found in favor
of the respondents. But even if the circumstances of this
case spelled out a cause of action for the respondents, which
the appellant denies, nevertheless, there is no competent
evidence upon which damage in the sum of $750.00 or in
any amount could be properly found by the court. In the
first place, ·all of the veal estate people who testified on the
element of damage, and which was the only evidence submitted on that subject, indicated that no damage of any
consequence could be attributed to the ditch at the rear of
the property (Tr. 54, 112, 136, and 145). This means rthat
rthe damage, if any, must be attributed solely to the covered
pipeline on the South and this poses fu.rfuer difficulties:
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First, there is no concrete or substantial evidence that this
pipeline is even on the property in question. On the contrary, there is substantial evidence 1Jo the effect that it is
not (Tr. 7, 90, and 147). Second, the only testimony Which
accorded to the pipeline (assuming it was upon the poperty)
any substantial damage whatsoever was that of Mr. Kenner, the respondents' W1itness, who predicated his estimate
of such damage upon matters of assumption and conjecture
void of legal sanction. First, he admitted that his estimate
was one of speculation (Tr. 55). Second, he stated that
the element of damage involved the considerations the ditch
would create in the mind of a potential buyer (Tr. 5-3.) . The
best evidence on :this item is a subjective examination of
the feelings of the buyers at the time of purchase. In the
light of Mr. Jones' testimony, this was evidently not a proper element to consider. W'hen asked by his counsel:

''Would you have purchased this property had
you known there was a ditch alon.g two sides of it?"
(Tr. 25)
he answered:
Q.

"In a way we would 1have and in a way we
wouldn't ·have. The only argument would :have been
whether we wanted our boy to be around an open ditch
or not." (Tr. 26)
A.

To this add the further fact fuat, with such knowledge,
they did purchase the property. Mr. Kenner's testimony
was not predicated on thls latter consideration and it ,jg
clearly evident that the dirtch made no ~serious impression
upon the respondents in reaching their decision to buy the
property. Third, Mr. Kenner testified that the biggest single
factor which he considered was ''would that ditch ~always
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exist in its present sport or was there permission to change
that right of way" (Tr. 55). This consideration was not
legally proper in view of the fact that there was not a scintilla orf evidence in the record to the effect that the ditch
would not always exist in its present location and the only
evidence offered on thart subject was rejected by the coort
(Tr. 132). Fourth, Mr. Kenner's testimony was predicated
on the legal conclusion and erroneous assumption that the
pipeline on the south, in effect, consumed 10 to 16 feet of
the respondents' land (Tr. 64) and he evidently attributed
. to that footage 100% loss orf value. Fifth, at another point
in his testimony, Mr. Kenner gave the impression that he
attrlburted his depreciation rate of 10% largely to the presence of rtJhe 90 degree turn in the ditch (Tr. 60), but without showing that any damage or problem had ever resulted
from such turn and admitting that he had never run into
a situation where depreciation had been predicated on such
a factor (Tr. 60). The entire line of MT. Kenner's testimony was contradictory and based on assumptions and legal conclusions i~mproperly admitted into evidence. On the
other ·hand, the testimony of Mr. Stein, Mr. Heal, and Mr.
Swapp all support the ·conclusion that the damage, if any,
was strictly nominal (Tr. 112, 116, 125, 136, 138, 141, and
145).
It should also be noted that the ditch at the rear of the
property constituted a potential benefit to the responden1s.
Fi'rst, the lower water users all rent their irrigation water
(Tr. 19) from year to year and there is no reasoo to suppose that the respondents could nort be accorded the same
privilege and utilize such water to service their lot. In addition, as indi~cated by Mr. Heal, some people would con-
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sider the presence of the ditch as an asset and conclude
that it enhaneed the value of the property (Tr. 141). See
14 Am Jur. 555, Sect. 110, citing STUHR vs. BU'I*I'ERFIELD and SCHURGER vs. MO'O·RMAN, cited herein.

POINT X
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMI'ITING THE RESPONDENTS' WITNESS, MR. KENNER, TO TESTIFY
AS TO WHAT HE USUALLY CO·NSIDERE·D TO BE A
REASONABLE WIDTH OCCUPIED BY AN EASEMENT.
Without specifying whether the easement was for the
purpose of a % inch pipeline or an airplane runway, the
court permitted respondents' counsel to ask Mr. Kenner
this question:
Q. ''Where you are appraising a piece of property, Mr. Kenner, and the easement is a prescriptive
easement, what do you usually oonsider as a reasonable width to take into consideration as being occupied by the easement?" (Tr. 64)

Over objection of Appellant's eounsel, the witness was
permitted to answer and the objection ·was overruled (Tr.
64). The answer of Mr. Kenner was as follows:
A. "This is a practical point, I think, large~ly, and
I would say that from 12 to 16 feet----Qtr rather, from
10 to 16 feet is the conventional or usual prescribed
easement." (Tr. 64)
This testimony and the ruling of the court with respect thereto were improper for the reasons (1) No sufficient foundation was laid to determine what type of easement was referred to and (2) being a prescriptive easeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ment, no consideration was given to the essential element
of the nature and extent of use upon which the easement
was esrtaJbUshed, and (3) the question called for a legal
conclusion. The answoc of the witness was significant and
prejudicial, bearing oo. the measure of damage, since he
accorded to his judgment of the damage suffered, considerations of the quantity of land taken by the easement.
POINT XI

THE CO·URT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THlE RESPONDENTS' OBJECTION TO THE TESTIMONY OF
THE APPELLANT'S WITNESS, MR. GROW, UPON THE
QUESTIO·N OF WHAT THE CANAL COMPANY DID
IN THE WAY O·F ACQUIESCING TO CHANGES IN
THE EASEMENT OVER SAID PROPERTY.
Testifying on the measure of damage to be accorded
the presence o[ the easement, the court permitted MT. Kenner to state that the biggest single factor which he 1ried
to take into consideration was this: "Would that ditch
always exist in its present spot or was there permission to
change that right of way" (Tr. 55). At the same time,
the court sustained the objection of Respondents' counsel
to the :ftoHowing testimony of Mr. Grow bearing on that
subject~

A. ''. . . . . so I called the Canal people and, as
I recall there were two of the Canal executives--! remember picking up one O!f them-and took them out
to look at the situation and get their recommendations.'' (Tr. 90)
The court first sustaind the respondents' objection to
this testimony on the ~orund that it was not material (Tr.
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91). Later, in the re-direct examination of Mr. Stein, the
following exchange between the court and counsel ensued:
THE CO·URT: ''The objection will be sustained.
May I ask if you have any evidence at all as to whether
or not this pipeline was constructed with the acquiescence or at the instance of the Canal Company or anything like that?" (Tr. 132)

MR. BULLOCK: If the court please, you sustained the objection when I was asking Mr. Grow concerning the matter and I think it error to have done so.
That was the purpose, :to show that the pipeline was
put in there with the full acquiescence of the Canal
Company and they specified the type of pipe that should
go in there and the size." (Tr. 132)

MR. SORENSEN: "We t;hink we would have no
objection if ·he brought in a member of the Canal Company to testify to that." (Tr. 132)
MR. BULLOC'K: "I don't think we need a member of the ·Canal Company to say so." (Tr. 132)
THE COURT: "I imagine you would.
be hearsay.'' (Tr. 132)

It would

THE COURT: "I think it would be hearsay if you
had Mr. ·Grow state what the ·Canal·Company said or
did." (Tr. 132)
MR. BULLOCK: "I don't intend to have him state
what they said. I intend to :have him state what he
did and who was present at the time that he did it and
what he did." (Tr. 132)
THE COURT:

"I think it is still !hearsay." (Tr.

133)
:MR. BULLOCK: "Well then, your ·honor's ruling with respect to the matters that I wanted to go
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into With Mr. Grow still stands, is that correct?" (Tr.
133)
THE COURT:

"Yes." (Tr. 133)

The foregoing ruling was clearly error and was pre-judicial. It was erroneous because it ~eluded testimony
.
as to what the parties did as distinguished from what the
parties said, with reference to the installation of the pipeline on the South. The testimony offered was clearly not
hearsay and was competent out of the mouth of Mr. Grow.
The ruling was prejudicial because the court had already
permitted Mr. Kenner to testify that he thought the biggest single factor 'he tried to take into ·consideration in assessing the damage was: "Would that ditch always exist
in its present spot or was there permission to change that
right of way?" (Tr. 55)
POINT XII
THE CO'URT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE OBJECTION OF THE APPELLANT TO THE QUESTION
PO'SED BY THE RESPONDENTS TO MR. STEIN AS
TO THE DIFFEREN~CE IN THE VALUE OF THE LAND
IN QUESTION IF THE SAME WERE 12 FEET NARR~O,WER AND 12 FEET LESS DEEP.
The same argument addressed to Point X of this brief
is applicable to Point XIT.
Over the objection of Appellant's counsel, respondents'
counsel was permitted to ask Mr. Stein on cross-examination if the value olf the house would be different if the lot
werre 12 feet narroiWer and 12 feet less deep (Tr. 123).
Ove~r Appellant's further objection, respondents' counsel

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
was further permitted to attempt to educate the witness on
the conclusions of law, as follows:
"You know, don't you, that of course an easement for a ditch takes more area than the ditch itself
occupies.'' (Tr. 126)
Q.

A.

"It could, yes." (Tr. 126)

Q.

"You know why, don't you?" (Tr. 126)

A.

"Yes." (Tr. 126)

Q. "That is, the OW!Ilers of the ditch have a right
to go on the premises with equipment and men?'' (Tr.
126)

Rights under a prescriptive easements are pvoscribed
and measured by the natu~re and ertent of use under which
·the easement was created, and the whole tenor of the testimony at this point and in this vein, preswned fiacts not
in evidence and rested upon legal conclusions.
CONCLUSION

The trial court erred in its Findings af Fact as sert out
herein and in its application of the law thereto, and the
Findings and Conclusions and Judgment of the court should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSON

Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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